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336 abstract 
In this paper we explore the transitions of social assistance beneficiaries to em-
ployment in Croatia. Data was sourced from the social welfare register for 208 
persons from the 2015 cohort of new, unemployed social assistance recipients in 
one Centre for Social Welfare, their outcomes tracked until June 2017. About a 
quarter of the recipients became employed within one year, in most cases with 
wages slightly higher than the statutory minimum. Out of them, about a quarter 
relapsed into social assistance status within a year. Following the World Bank 
Employment Barriers approach, we examine whether outcomes are associated 
with disincentives to work (inactivity trap), lack of work-related capabilities, or 
gendered engagement with in-household work. We found the average participa-
tion tax rate (PTR) for recipients to stand at 57%, yet no effect of PTR, benefit 
level, debt or PTR level on transition to employment was identified. With respect 
to capabilities, the role of human capital (vocational in particular), work experi-
ence and age turned out to be consistent with prior research. Substitution of in-
house work is consistent with the finding that women are less likely to get em-
ployed if living in a household with dependents.
Keywords: welfare-to-employment transitions, social assistance recipients, 
participation tax rate, employment barriers
1 IntroductIon
There are two kinds of income support that unemployed persons in Croatia can 
access, in line with the continental social security tradition. The first is contribu-
tion-based unemployment benefit which is conditional on prior employment (at 
least 9 months of employment in the last 24 months) and related to the prior earn-
ings of the individual. Unemployment benefit can be received for up to 15 months 
although most recipients qualify for 3-6 months. Such a conditionality and the 
limited duration make for a rather patchy coverage of the unemployed (graph 1, 
grey line), in particular during periods of economic growth, when few long-term 
employed enter unemployment. 
The second support option for an unemployed person is the guaranteed mini-
mum benefit (GMB), a means-tested social assistance benefit granted at the 
household level. In order to qualify for GMB, citizens who are fit to work must 
be registered as unemployed and demonstrate efforts at activation. The number 
of unemployed GMB recipients over the past decade stood at a rather stable 
level, with oscillations (between 40,000 to 50,000) following the economic cy-
cle. At the end of 2016, there were a total of 47,000 unemployed GMB recipi-
ents, which translates to 1.7% of the working-age population, 2.6% of active 
population (per Labour Force Survey, LFS), or about 19.9% of registered unem-
ployed persons.
While the numbers of beneficiaries are substantial, to date there has been no em-
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337case of GMB recipients. Since national SILC data are unsuitable for the task1, this 
paper uses administrative data in order to establish the feasibility of such an effort, 
while providing basic insights about the incidence of transitions by GMB recipi-
ents to employment and the mechanisms involved. 
graph 1 
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Source: Croatian Employment Service and Ministry of Social Welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we discuss the employment 
barriers involved in welfare-to-work transitions, identifying three distinct theoreti-
cal mechanisms. In third section we present our data collection, organization and 
analytical approach. The fourth section is composed of three parts. In the first we 
discuss the structure of unemployed GMB recipients, according to criteria identified 
as relevant in the initial discussion. In the second we observe welfare-to-employ-
ment transitions in general, differences between groups relevant for each theoretical 
mechanism, and estimate a joint Cox proportional hazards model. In the third part 
we examine outcomes of successful transitions: remuneration, realized PTR and 
relapse into GMB. In the final section we summarise the findings, discuss limita-
tions and make case for applying this approach to more extensive data collection.
2 tHeoretIcal MecHanIsMs
We will broadly follow the Employment Barriers approach introduced by the 
OECD and the World Bank (Fernandez et al., 2016). In individual cases, barriers 
might emerge from lack of financial incentives or lack of work-related capabili-
ties, each calling for a different set of policy interventions.
1 Incidence of GMB is too rare to produce a subsample suitable for analysis, while survey design does not 
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338 Incentives to work might be low due to high non-labour income, but GMB is 
strictly means-tested and non-labour income of recipients is monitored, so this 
dimension does not feature as a barrier in the case of GMB recipients. However, 
the inactivity trap due to a high level of earnings-replacement benefits might act 
as a barrier. The income criterion that qualifies a household for GMB is lower than 
the net minimum wage for all but the largest households2, making GMB effec-
tively limited to jobless households, or households with very low (formal) work 
intensity. Consequently, the first employment of any household member usually 
leads to withdrawal of GMB for the entire household (or a household member 
leaving the household). While household benefit level is capped at the level of a 
single gross minimum wage (HRK 3,276 in 2017), in most cases GMB is supple-
mented by other benefits that use GMB as prerequisite3. Those additional benefits 
are all withdrawn if household income exceeds the GMB qualification threshold. 
Such a setup leads to an “inactivity trap” in which unemployed persons with low 
earnings potential and receiving benefits face a situation where taking up employ-
ment may lead to little (or no) increase in disposable income as a result of the 
combined effects of benefit withdrawal and higher tax burdens on in-work earn-
ings (Carone et al., 2004). In other words, for households in the inactivity trap, 
work does not pay off. The inactivity trap is characterised by a very high marginal 
effective tax rate (METR), which is effectively the participation tax rate (PTR) in 
cases when starting work-based income equals zero (Jara Tamayo, Gasior and 
Makovec, 2017). The level of PTR is strongly associated with social security set-
up, household structure and earning potential. In Croatia, Bejaković, Urban and 
Bezeredi (2013) have identified that transition from inactivity to single-earner 
minimum-wage bears PTR above 100% for individuals from jobless households 
with dependent children and single-parent households. Similar inactivity trap es-
timates for such individuals are published by the EU Tax and Benefits Indicator 
Database (EU-TBID), at 102% and 110% respectively. For a single person house-
hold or two-adult household PTR for such a transition is still substantial but lower 
(63% and 72%), primarily due to GMB being far lower than the minimum wage. 
This leads us to expect that unemployed GMB recipients from households with 
dependent children and single-parent households would face greater PTR, and 
thus have lower economic incentives to make the transition to employment.
Lack of work-related capabilities makes for another set of barriers to employment 
(Fernandez et al., 2016) that hinder access of GMB recipients to the labour mar-
ket. In particular, the role of human capital, drawn either from education or work 
2 Income threshold for qualification since 2014 stands at about 30% of net minimum wage (HRK 800) for sin-
gle households, and 37% of the minimum wage (HRK 960) for households with two adult persons. The lat-
ter is increased by a further 18% of the minimum wage (HRK 480) per additional adult member of the house-
hold and by 12% (HRK 320) for any minor dependents – up until the cap is reached (comprising about 6 to 
8 household members). The amount is additionally increased by a further 4.5% of the minimum wage (HRK 
120) per additional minor dependents if it is a single-parent household.
3 GMB is coupled with other benefits that use GMB as a prerequisite – such as free school textbooks, electric-
ity grant fee which amounts HRK 200 introduced in September 2015, a grant for firewood, housing allow-
ance or local government benefits (Šućur et al., 2016). These coupled benefits are not considered as income 





































































41 (3) 335-358 (2017)
339experience is crucial to understanding employability. Level of human capital has 
been consistently identified as the strongest predictors of career progression (Fu-
gate, Kinicki and Ashforth, 2004), confirmed by several research efforts in the 
Croatian context (Šverko, Galić and Maslić Seršić, 2006; Botrić, 2009; Matković, 
2011; Urban and Bezeredi, 2016; Lucić, forthcoming). While access to employ-
ment improves with level of education and work experience, both are rather scarce 
among unemployed GMB recipients. Advanced age might also act as a barrier, 
due to the greater incidence of health limitations or obsolescence of human capi-
tal, as well as the less favourable perceptions of employers (Van der Heijde and 
Van der Heijden, 2005; for Croatia Vehovec, 2008).
Engagement in in-household work and production can act as a barrier to employ-
ment. The need for household work increases with household size, in particular with 
care responsibilities for dependent household members. However, with very limited 
funds to procure goods and services on the market, GMB recipients are likely to 
adopt strategy of producing/providing them within the household themselves (cf. 
Bagić et al., 2017). Yet there is strong evidence from the general population that in 
Croatia women are still the prevailing providers of household work (Bijelić, 2011; 
Bartolac and Kamenov, 2013), as well as evidence of motherhood penalty on labour 
market participation (Dobrotić, Matković and Baran, 2010; Dobrotić, Matković and 
Zrinščak, 2013; Lucić; forthcoming). The traditional household division of labour, 
in line with the new home economics theory, would lead to weaker labour supply for 
women as they substitute household production for labour market participation – 
and the greater labour market engagement of men (cf. Grotti and Scherer, 2014)4. 
Goods and services produced for own household provide substantial utility for the 
household, are not treated as income and thus do not involve risk of sanctions on 
GMB recipients. Therefore, substitution of household work/production for labour 
market participation is an attractive option for GMB recipients and a common sur-
vival strategy among households living in poverty (Bagić et al., 2017). Such a pat-
tern is more likely to be found among women, when there is a partner within the 
household and dependent family members present.
In short, we identify three distinct (and non-exclusive) kinds of barriers to em-
ployment of GMB recipients: weak incentives to work because of high PTR, 
scarce work-related capabilities, and substitution of household work for labour 
market participation (graph 2). We identified household structure as an important 
factor in both incentives to work and substitution of female labour market partici-
pation. 
4 Grotti and Scherer assume positive partner effect of “additional resources”, but in the jobless households 
observed in this study there is no variation – as lack of financial, social and cultural resources in jobless 
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340 graph 2 





Weak incentives to take up paid employment
   – Inactivity trap: high participation tax rate (PTR)
lack of work-related capabilities
   – Human capital: education and work experience
   – Age: health, obsolete human capital, discrimination
engagement in in-household work
  – Substitution for labour market participation
  – Care and in-household production (survival strategy)
Scarce transitions to em
ploym
ent
Source: Authors, adapted from Fernandez et al. (2016).
3 data and analYtIcal aPProacH
In this paper, we are pioneering the empirical evidence on welfare-to-employment 
transitions in Croatia in an effort to identify the dynamics and patterns of the exits 
of benefit recipients to employment status. For this purpose, with the consent of 
the Ministry of Social Welfare, we collected data on all the unemployed persons 
who were granted GMB in 2015 in one Croatian Centre for Social Welfare5, and 
then followed their status up until June 2017. 
An anonymised dataset was created using the digital social welfare register (Soc-
Skrb) data containing information on household benefit level, beginning and end 
of benefit usage. For each member of those households, we collected information 
on age, gender, settlement, prior recipient status, grounds for admission into ben-
eficiary status. SocSkrb data was supplemented by additional information from 
the centre’s case record: prior employment experience, grounds for cessation of 
beneficiary status6, education level and field, amount of debt and duration of un-
employment prior to being granted GMB, level of GMB and other benefits, as 
well as wage for those who made the transition. Also, we generated household-
level attributes (household type: single, single-parent, several adults without de-
pendents, several adults with dependents; presence of nursery age children). For 
each household, a PTR for taking up a minimum-wage job (HRK 2,496) was 
calculated, taking into account their given level and structure of benefits.
5 Centre for Social Welfare, Požega, located in a moderately underdeveloped region covers about 1% of pop-
ulation of Croatia. The region is one of the twelve counties within the lowest grouping of the national Devel-
opment Index, and among the five with the lowest GDP/per capita – as it stands at about 60% of the nati onal 
average. However, the share of GMB recipients in the population in 2015 (2.2%) was slightly lower than the 
national average of 2.4%.
6 GMB beneficiaries can have their beneficiary status changed due to employment but also due to personal 
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341We have tracked all the sampled households from January 2015 (or the month 
when they were first granted GMB in 2015) all the way to June 2017. Thus epi-
sodes were created containing duration, outcome, episode-specific (e.g. level of 
GMB) and person-specific (e.g. gender) data. Most households had one episode of 
GMB on record, but some had several. Also, changes in composition of house-
holds (e.g. a person moving out of the household or a dependent child becoming 
unemployed) were accounted for. In cases where the status of unemployed GMB 
recipients had not changed for some members of the household (e.g. one house-
hold member had lost the GMB benefit – warranting a new administrative act and 
formal episode), adjacent episodes for those members were merged in one con-
tinuous spell. 
During 2015, a total of 142 households with unemployed members were granted 
GMB; in all, there were 344 beneficiaries7. Over the observed 30 month period, 
a total of 208 individuals from those new households were classified as unem-
ployed GMB recipients for at least a month8, for a total of 239 episodes of un-
employment. Four persons who turned 18 or 65 during the period were excluded 
from the analysis. 
Data was analysed using the event history (also known as survival analysis) ap-
proach, with general employment dynamics being described by estimation of Ka-
plan-Meier failure function, and differences of failure functions between groups 
being tested with log-rank test. For the multivariate framework exploring contribu-
tion of covariates associated with the aforementioned mechanisms, we have applied 
Cox proportional hazards regression model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; 
Cleves, Gould and Marchenko, 2016) with shared frailty at the level of individuals.
4 results
4.1 structure of neW GMb benefIcIarIes
Before venturing forth with outcomes, we will describe the structure of our GMB 
cohort (cf. table A1 for source data on structure, estimated PTR and employment 
outcomes within 12 months for each category).
Starting with characteristics likely to affect incentives to work, unemployed GMB 
beneficiaries are heterogeneous with respect to the total level of GMB-related 
benefits their household receives (graph 3, upper pane), interdecile range stretch-
ing from HRK 1,000 to HRK 2,040, yet the modal value received by 29% of 
beneficiaries being exactly HRK 1,000 (single household benefit with electricity 
supplement). When child benefits are added, the distribution widens towards HRK 
1,000 to HRK 3,518, and the average total of household benefits increases from 
7 This number represents only a minority of the stock of the GMB recipients within the centre, which at the 
end of 2015 amounted to 728 active GMB with a total of 1,420 beneficiaries. There were 610 unemployed 
users most of them long-term beneficiaries.
8 Out of them, 9 (in 12 episodes) were not required to be registered as unemployed with the CES due to being 
older than 60 or having a child younger than one year – none of them got employed during the observation 
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342 HRK 1,388 to HRK 1,781 (graph 3, lower pane). More than half of GMB benefi-
ciaries had their bank accounts blocked due to indebtedness, and 42% were under 
debt execution/repossession orders exceeding two minimum wages.
graph 3 
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Source: SocSkrb, calculation of the authors.
With respect to the household structure, about half of the new beneficiaries belong 
to household types supposedly characterised by the inactivity trap: single-parent 
households and households with two or more adults with dependents9. Yet about a 
third of new unemployed GMB beneficiaries resided in a single-person house-
hold, and about one fifth recipients were living in a multiple-person household 
without dependants10, supposedly facing considerably lower PTR as barrier to 
employment. However, the average calculated PTR for taking up a minimum-
wage job based on household structure and benefit levels of cohort observed re-
sulted in PTR estimates within a 9 percentage point range: the lowest for single-
person household (52%), and the highest for household with dependants (61% – 
yet much lower than 102% in TBID). Therefore, we will turn our analytical focus 
toward the calculated level of PTR as a direct indicator of work disincentive.
We have calculated average PTR for taking a minimum wage job for unemployed 
GMB recipients that we have tracked at 57%. For about three quarters of them 
minimum wage PTR stands between 50% and 70%, with modal bin about 50% 
9 In all but ten cases those were minors, while other were persons unfit for work. 
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343(graph 4). A minimum wage PTR lower than 40% is mostly observed for large 
families with large child benefits, or small households where not all members 
qualify for GMB. High minimum wage PTR is to be found among households 
with GMB-based benefits close to the minimum wage (coupled with housing and 
electricity supplement), while receiving no or limited child benefits. However, in 
no case in our cohort did PTR for taking up a minimum wage job exceed 90%.
graph 4 
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Estimated PTR
As for work-related capabilities, the majority of newly unemployed GMB recipi-
ents (56%) had just compulsory education or no education, 43% had secondary 
education and 1% had tertiary education. The educational structure of the tracked 
GMB cohort is roughly similar to that of all the GMB beneficiaries of the Centre 
for Social Welfare, about one fifth had no prior employment experience whatso-
ever, and similar share had more than ten years of tenure, while the majority of 
unemployed beneficiaries had a modest amount of employment experience.
The age structure of new GMB recipients is diverse, with most beneficiaries in the 
30-50 age group, trailed by the 50-64 group. Slightly more than half of new ben-
eficiaries were at least once registered as GMB beneficiaries prior to 2015 and 
were effectively returning to GMB. About one fifth were long-term unemployed 
by the time GMB kicked in.
With respect to households more inclined to in-household work, altogether 48% 
of recipients lived with frail or underage dependants in the household, and 15% 
had nursery-aged children (0-3). Our tracked cohort has characteristics very simi-
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344 ratio. While men are somewhat overrepresented (57%) among newly unemployed 
GMB beneficiaries and in particular among single-person households (75%), 
women account for the majority (85%) of single-parent recipients. 
4.2 transItIons to eMPloYMent
About 43% of tracked episodes had not been completed by the end of the observa-
tion period, while other users had made the transition out of GMB status (table 1). 
A GMB episode most often ended due to the employment of recipient (22.3% out 
of whom 2.6% were still receiving GMB after employment) or employment of 
another household member (13.5%). About 18% of episodes ceased due to other 
reasons: in 4.7% episodes, beneficiaries were sanctioned due to inactivity (leaving 
the unemployment register leads to withdrawal of benefits), and in 4.3% due to 
excessive household income.
Table 1 
Outcome of the unemployment episode of GMB recipients
outcome %
GMB ceased – in employment 22.3
GMB ceased – household income other than employment  4.3
GMB ceased – employment of another household member 13.5
GMB ceased – not seeking job  4.7
GMB ceased – other (e.g. death, migration, prison…)  8.6
GMB recipient – disability  0.4
GMB recipient – in employment  2.6
Status unchanged as of May-2017 42.9
Source: SocSkrb, calculation of the authors.
Such distribution of outcomes, with varying time windows of observation, limited 
number of participants and a lot of censoring due to the employment of other 
household members led to a choice survival analysis framework, with transition 
to employment being observed as a relevant event.
The Kaplan-Meier estimate of failure function indicates that about 24% of unem-
ployed GMB recipients found a job within one year of entering GMB (graph 5). 
This is significantly less than 55% of employed within 12 months among all who 
entered unemployment in the 2012-2014 period (Lucić, forthcoming). Within two 
years, the share had increased to 34%, indicating a decline of the hazard rate for 
transition towards employment, yet no isolation from the labour market11. How-
ever, when the employment of any household member is observed as an outcome 
(effectively ending the GMB episode), then transitions stand at 36% within a year 
and 47% within two years.
11 Transitions into employment of long-term beneficiaries might be facilitated by the provision that they are 
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345graph 5 
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95% CI Failure function
Source: SocSkrb, calculation of the authors.
Moving on to exploration of the role of employment barriers, we start with criteria 
indicating lack of incentives to work. However, with the observed cohort of GMB 
recipients, we fail to observe a consistent association between either PTR, benefit 
level (GMB-related benefits only, or coupled with child benefits) or indebtedness 
and transitions to employment. That is, unemployed GMB recipients with a higher 
level of benefits, deeper in a debt spiral or those who would be exposed to higher 
PTR if getting into a job are not less (or more) likely to find a job than others 
(graph 6). The only criteria where diverging outcomes were identified is total 
benefit level – with beneficiaries from two middle income groups underperform-
ing (HRK 1,160 – 1,400) or overperforming (HRK 1,560 – 2,350) respectively. 
Such observations do not conform to the patterns that would be expected if lack of 
incentives due to inactivity trap were the prevailing mechanism at work. 
Descriptive evidence is stronger with respect to the lack of work-related capabili-
ties acting as a barrier (graph 7). Formal education level is associated with em-
ployment outcomes among GMB recipients. The few beneficiaries with tertiary 
education had bounced back into employment quickly. Among other, more preva-
lent, groups, there is an advantage for persons who have completed short voca-
tional education programmes (such as waiters, cooks, electricians, hairdressers, 
salespersons, etc.), with about 40% getting a job within a year. On the other hand, 
less than one fifth of beneficiaries with no upper secondary education got employed 
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346 beneficiaries with four-year upper secondary education (technical or general) are 
no better than for those with no upper secondary education. Yet, observed out-
comes for GMB recipients for any given level of education are substantially 
weaker than those demonstrated at the national level for persons entering unem-
ployment in the 2012-2014 period (Lucić, forthcoming).
graph 6 
Kaplan-Meier failure function: transitions into employment (recipient), by disincentive 
for work criteria
Months since becoming GMB recipient
Up to HRK 1,000
HRK 1,080 up to HRK 1,380
HRK 1,400 up to HRK 1,720
HRK 1,800 up to HRK 2,840
Months since becoming GMB recipient
Up to HRK 1,000
HRK 1,160 up to HRK 1,400
HRK 1,560 up to HRK 2,350
HRK 2,398 up to HRK 5,037
Months since becoming GMB recipient
Min. wage PTR < 50%
Min. wage PTR 50-60%
Min. wage PTR 60-70%
Min. wage PTR > 70%
Months since becoming GMB recipient
Account not blocked
Account blocked – debt up to 2 min. wages
Account blocked – debt 2-12 min. wages
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(3) Estimated PTR for taking a minimum-wage job
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Log-rank tests: (1) chi2(3)=3.67; (2) chi2(3)=8.38*; (3) chi2(3)=0.98; (4) chi2(3)=2.10. 
Source: SocSkrb, calculation of the authors.
There is some evidence for the importance of work experience for the employ-
ment of GMB recipients. The association, however noisy, broadly fits the com-
monly found inverse U pattern: those with no prior employment experience and 
those with more than 10 years having a weaker chance for employment. Failure 
functions with respect to age demonstrate a well-established age effect: only 10 
per cent of recipients older than 50 got employed within one year (cf. 37% in the 
general population of the unemployed), but no distinction in employment transi-
tions is to be found for persons 30-50 and those under 30. So far, at the descriptive 
level employment patterns of unemployed GMB recipients seem to be in line with 
the human capital framework – patterns for education, tenure and age being con-
sistent in direction but subdued compared to those observed for the general popu-
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347graph 7 
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Log-rank tests: (1) chi2(4)=17.46**; (2) chi2(4)=12.12*; (3) chi2(2)=5.37+; (4) chi2(1)=4.24*.
Source: SocSkrb, calculation of the authors.
There is a substantial difference in transition dynamics with respect to gender, 
with almost twice as many men than women finding a job within a year from en-
tering GMB (but with indication of convergence later on). However, such a differ-
ence is not found among the general unemployed population (cf. Lucić, forthcom-
ing), and merits exploration of the gender-specific effect of household structure.
Employment of men and women in GMB follows different patterns, depending on 
household type and their family role (graph 8). Male GMB recipients are more likely 
to make the transition to employment when there are dependants in the household. It 
is exactly these configurations in which female GMB recipients have very weak 
chances for employment during first twelve months. Yet female employment perfor-
mance is similar to that of men when there are no other dependants in the household. 
Such patterns are in line with traditional gendered specialisation within the family, and 
the substitution of in-household work for labour supply for unemployed female GMB 
recipients, consistent with care responsibility hypothesis.
The descriptive findings are broadly confirmed with the Cox proportional hazard 
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348 responding to all three barriers, albeit some in reduced (dichotomized) form due 
to the limited number of observations. We have introduced both PTR and total 
household benefit level simultaneously in order to distinguish the effect of total 
available resources from non-labour income with the inactivity trap due to poten-
tial taxation of labour income. Interaction of gender with household structure and 
the presence of a nursery-age child was introduced to account for the gender-
specific substitution of in-household work for labour income. The proportional 
hazard assumption was tested using Schoenfeld residuals on the fitted model, 
proving satisfactory in general, apart for the gender/single parent household inter-
action (rho -0.24, p<0.1) and total benefit level (rho -0.23, p<0.05). 
graph 8











































































Households with 2+ adults and dependents
Households with 2+ adults, without dependents
Log-rank tests: (Men): chi2(3)=12.09**; (Women): LR test chi2(3)=3.67.
Source: SocSkrb, calculation of the authors.
Starting with work-based capacities, in the multivariate model, advanced age still 
seems to be hindrance for both men and women, net of human capital. Vocational 
education and to lesser extent prior employment experience contribute to transi-
tion to employment, implying the role of (lack of) capabilities. Notably, duration 
of unemployment prior to entering GMB status and history of using GMB do not 
hinder transitions to unemployment.
With respect to disincentives to work, no linear contribution of benefit level, PTR 
for getting a minimum-wage job, or existence of substantive debt was identified in 
terms of transition to employment. 
With respect to household work substitution, no effect was identified for house-
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349seem to be less likely to make the transition to employment than men, yet this 
seems not to be the case when there are no dependants to care for, or for women 
in single-person households. No additional effect was identified when a child was 
present in the household. 
4.3  WaGes, assuMed and realIzed PartIcIPatIon taX rate of GMb 
recIPIents WHo found a Job
The information accessed through SocSkrb system during the process of GMB 
administration allows for detailed information on benefits of household members, 
as well as wages of beneficiaries that managed to find a job. In 58% of cases, 
achieved wage was higher than 110% of the 2016 statutory net minimum wage 
(HRK 2,496), in 44% of cases higher than 125% of statutory wage, and in 12% of 
cases higher than 150% of minimum wage, the highest on record being 2.2 times 
higher than minimum wage, although still lower than the average wage level 
(graph 9). However indicative, this is not representative of the earning potential of 
GMB recipients in general, as those who failed to find a job might have had even 
less capacities – and worse opportunities (cf. Bezeredi and Urban, 2016). While 
an extension of this research might lead to estimation of potential wages, the data 
at hand can be used to calculate actual PTR for those GMB recipients who did find 
a job. The spread of actual PTR for those who made the transition was rather 
broad (table 2): from 31% to 96%, standing at an average 53%. Average realized 
PTR was somewhat higher for households with dependants (58%), and about 50-
55% for other household types. It is worth mentioning that for any given house-
hold type, the average realized PTR was slightly lower than one hypothesised 
under the minimum wage assumption – as in many cases wages turned out to be 
higher than minimal. 
graph 9 
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350 Table 2 
Hypothetical PTR, average realized PTR and wage of GMB recipients who made 
transition to employment, by household type
Hypothetical Ptr 
for all recipients, 
% (at 35% avg. 
wage)
actual Ptr, 




HRK (for those 
who got 
employed
Single person household 52 50 2,831
Single parent household 56 54 3,577
Household with dependents 61 58 3,029
Household without dependants 58 55 2,915
Total 53 2,998
Source: SocSkrb, calculation of the authors.
4.4 relaPse Into socIal assIstance
Transition into employment itself does not guarantee stable labour market attach-
ment. Successful activation should lead to stable employment, but the same set of 
barriers might push the vulnerable part of the population back into the social as-
sistance system. Therefore, relapse into social assistance was another outcome 
that we have observed within the survival analysis framework, although only for 
the 58 GMB recipients who did manage to get a job, and for a considerably shorter 
period of observation. About a quarter of GMB recipients who got into employ-
ment had relapsed into GMB within 12 months from employment (graph 10). 
graph 10 
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351While the number of observations was insufficient for application of more sophis-
ticated model, we have compared patterns of relapse with respect to gender and 
effective PTR of employment (based on wage and prior benefit level). It seems 
that women are more likely to relapse into GMB than men, while persons who 
faced above-average PTR when entering employment (for whom work paid off to 
lesser extent) were less likely to return to GMB (graph 11). This warrants more 
research.
graph 11 
Kaplan-Meier failure function: relapse from employment into GMB, by realized 
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Log-rank tests: (METR) chi2(1)=3.86*; Gender LR test chi2(1)=4.08*.
Source: SocSkrb, Tax Administration, calculation of the authors.
5 conclusIon
In this small-scale analysis based on a rich collection of data used in the adminis-
tration of social assistance, we have managed to show that transitions from GMB 
to employment do happen, but are far from commonplace. In the case of this 
particular centre for social welfare, about one quarter of unemployed persons who 
were granted GMB got into employment within a year, in most cases for wages 
less than 150% of the statutory minimum wage, and about one quarter of those 
who got employed returned to GMB within another year. 
While the population of GMB recipients is quite heterogeneous, the majority has 
failed to complete upper secondary education, and a substantial share has ad-
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352 family responsibilities. Being exposed to strict means testing, their financial re-
sources are very limited (or even negative due to debt) and they face withdrawal 
of most benefits as soon as they get into employment. For this reason, we set about 
examining the role of three distinct barriers to employment: lack of work-related 
capabilities, lack of incentives to work and the substitution of in-household labour.
Our analysis suggests that transition to work varies greatly due to individual em-
ployability and the gender-household configuration nexus. In terms of work-based 
capabilities, findings are consistent with prior research with the general popula-
tion or unemployed in Croatia (Šverko et al., 2006; Botrić, 2009; Matković, 2011; 
Urban and Bezeredi, 2016; Lucić, forthcoming). Namely, GMB recipients with 
vocational education make the transition to employment about twice as often as 
others, confirming the key role of education, while differences due to tenure and 
age are consistent in direction but their effect is subdued compared to those ob-
served for the unemployed in general (Urban and Bezeredi, 2016; Lucić, forth-
coming). As for disincentives to work, we found that individually calculated PTR 
for finding a minimum-wage job to be a substantial 57% on average, but more 
compressed (interquartile range 50-60%), and less divergent with respect to 
household types than established for hypothetical households (e.g. Bejaković, Ur-
ban and Bezeredi, 2013). However, we found no conclusive evidence that level of 
minimum-wage PTR, total level of household benefits, or indebtedness are associ-
ated with transition to employment. Possibly the incentives for job search due to 
low benefit level might have been negated by the negative effect of financial hard-
ship towards finding a job (Šverko et al., 2006; Galić, 2011). As for substitution of 
in-household work as survival strategy and answer to care responsibilities, we 
found no evidence of single-person households having better access to labour 
market, but female GMB recipients are less likely to find a job if they live in 
households with partner and dependants. 
Our findings are best taken as provisional proof of the concept, as the scope of our 
analysis has several shortcomings. First, it follows up only about one per cent of 
one year’s entrants into GMB in Croatia, all from the same region. Possible idio-
syncrasies of social welfare centre or local (predominantly rural) community lead 
to caution in the generalisation of findings. Extending the scope of analysis to the 
entire country would not only provide a more sophisticated model and reliable 
estimates by increasing the sample by two degrees of magnitude, but would intro-
duce enough variation to estimate the effect of job opportunities (another barrier 
in the WB conceptual framework) and role of other contextual variables. Second, 
as only new entrants into GMB were observed, and outcomes were traced for 
quite a short period (at most two and a half years), our findings extend only to 
“short-term” GMB beneficiaries. However, by the end of 2015, 72% of beneficia-
ries in Croatia received GMB for more than one year and 26% for more than five 
years, making a strong case for an extension of the analysis of transitions and bar-
riers to employment towards long-term GMB beneficiaries. Third, in all the cases 
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353the observed individual (e.g. employment of partner), our observations are effec-
tively censored, and no information on subsequent employment for given indi-
vidual was gathered under the current approach, probably resulting in an underes-
timation of transitions to employment. 
Until such an extension is made, this analysis provides some circumstantial evi-
dence in favour of activation interventions targeting all adults in beneficiary 
households, providing GMB beneficiaries vocational education and care services 
where needed in order to facilitate transitions to employment.
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354 aPPendIX
Table a1 












No formal education 19 55 12
Compulsory education (ISCED 2) 37 54 15
Vocational education – 3yr (ISCED 3C) 32 60 36
Upper secondary education – 4yr (ISCED 3AB) 11 62  9
Professional tertiary education (ISCED5)  1 71 34
University education (ISCED 6)  0
Prior employment history  
No 22 57 11
Up to 1 year 14 56 29
1-5 years 29 58 18
5-10 years 15 55 34
More than 10 years 20 58 17
unemployment duration 
(when starting GMB episode)
 
Less than 6 months 68 56 23
6-12 months  6 64  8
1-3 years 12 58 28
3 or more years  7 57 13
Not required or unknown  7 57  0
Age (as of 2016)  
0-17  2 53  0
18-29 22 60 26
30-50 47 57 26
51-64 28 55  9
Gender  
Male 57 57 26
Female 43 57 14
received GMb prior to 2015 53 56 22
Household type  
Single household 34 52 18
Single parent  6 56  7
Household with dependents 42 61 24
Household without dependants 18 58 21
number of dependent children  
No 52 54 19
1 19 60 21
2 16 65 21
3 or more 13 55 24
















































































debt – account due to debt execution 
process
Account not blocked 43 57 23
Account blocked – up to 2 min. wages 15 58 23
Account blocked – 2 to up to 12 min. wages 28 58 15
Account blocked – more than 12 min. wages 14 55 20
estimated participation tax rate for taking 
up a minimum-wage job
Less than 50% 13 40 15
50-60% 47 53 19
60-70% 29 66 24
More than 70% 11 77 22
Total household benefit level  
(including child benefit)
Up to HRK 1,000 28 48 21
HRK 1,160 to HRK 1,400 25 55 12
HRK 1,560 to HRK 2,350 23 65 28
HRK 2,390 to HRK 5,037 24 62 22
total 57 20
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356 Table a2 
Cox regression results: transitions of GMB recipients to employment
 coeff std. err
barrier: lack of work-based capacities   
education (ref: no formal education)   
   Compulsory education (ISCED 2)  0.046 (0.525)
   Vocational education – 3yr (ISCED 3C)  1.053* (0.497)
   Upper secondary education – 4yr (ISCED 3AB)  0.354 (0.707)
   Professional tertiary education (ISCED5)  1.046 (1.289)
age (ref: 18-29)   
   30-50 -0.173 (0.415)
   51-64 -1.352 (0.524)
Employment history (at least some tenure)  1.097+ (0.562)
Unemployed <12 months when started receiving GMB  0.344 (0.371)
Prior GMB recipient (received GMB prior to 2015  0.276 (0.310)
barrier: lack of incentives to work   
Bank account blocked (debt greater than 2 minimum wages) -0.419 (0.305)
Total household benefit level (including child benefit) (per 
HRK 1,000)
-0.061 (0.209)
Estimated PTR for taking up a minimum-wage job min (per %)  0.007 (0.014)
barrier: in-household work and care   
Gender: Female  -1.791** (0.576)
Household configuration (ref: 2+ adults, with dependent 
members)
  
   Single person household -0.752 (0.506)
   Single parent household  0.087 (1.180)
   Household without dependants -0.612 (0.731)
Interaction: gender and household configuration   
   Female*Single person household  2.419** (0.794)
   Female*Single parent household  0.627 (1.404)
   Female*Household without dependants  2.235* (0.999)
Female*Nursery-age child in household -0.326 (0.891)
Observations 233  
Individuals 202  
Events (employment) 58  
Log likelihood -265.4  
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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